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This chapter on the Brazilian economy after 1994 is of a somewhat different nature 
compared to those on the economy in earlier periods. It is more speculative than its 
predecessors and based on a more restricted range of bibliographical material, as there 
is less consolidated research work on the period. It is to stress the obvious that the 
essay is inevitably marred to a certain degree by the lack of a sufficiently long time 
perspective. But it was thought that the benefits of providing a provisional account of 
the more recent economic developments in Brazil far outstripped the costs.  
  
The Brazilian economic history from 1995 to 2004 was still dominated by efforts to 
stabilise the economy. The essay is structured around an analysis of the eventful 
macroeconomic policies followed during the period. Other aspects are also 
considered, but often only to allow a clearer picture of the evolution of 
macroeconomic policies and the constraints they had to face. At first, the main 
economic policy objective was to consolidate the results of the Real Plan and to make 
sure that the long high inflation experience was really over. But soon the need to put 
public accounts under control and to make a sizable external adjustment would 
become the main challenges to be faced. A major balance of payments crisis in early 
1999 imposed much overdue drastic changes in economic policy. Further disturbances 
occurred in 2002, the last year of Cardoso’s second term, as financial markets 
reflected fears that economic policy could be reversed with the likely victory of the 
opposition presidential candidate, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. But, somewhat 
surprisingly, the new government opted for policies that by and large represented a 
continuation of the orthodox economic policies of its predecessor.  
 
In contrast with the previous fifteen years there was success, in spite of many 
difficulties. Advance in the stabilisation front required reforms and institutional 
building efforts that brought very important changes and a sound foundation for future 
economic expansion. But effective growth performance over the period continued to 
be mediocre: between 1994 and 2004 per capita GDP (gross domestic product) 
increased an average of only 0.9 percent yearly. Together with structural fiscal 
difficulties, low economic growth imposed strict constraints on policies seeking to 
alleviate the country’s severe social imbalances.  
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1.  CARRYING THE REAL PLAN THROUGH 
 
During the four years of President Cardoso’s first term of office there was a 
permanent division within the government concerning the nature of economic policies 
to be implemented. This struggle for ascendancy opposed policy makers  in the 
Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank to the self-denominated 
desenvolvimentistas, mainly in the ministries of Planning and Telecommunications 
and in the BNDES – Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
[National Economic and Social Development Bank]. The first group, headed by Pedro 
Malan, the Minister of Finance, placed consolidation of inflation control at the top of 
the agenda, wanted to preserve the exchange rate as the monetary anchor of the 
economy, stressed the need for fiscal and monetary discipline and defended a less 
protectionist trade policy. Their opposers, headed by José Serra, first Minister of 
Planning and later Minister of Health, wanted to give immediate priority to economic 
growth and favoured a more devalued exchange rate, greater flexibility towards 
inflation control, laxer fiscal and monetary policies and a reversal of trade 
liberalization, mainly for the benefit of the influential automotive sector. Nurtured by 
the President’s persistent ambivalence, this division would lead to a highly 
inconsistent macroeconomic policy, marked by irresolution and halfway 
compromising decisions, that would drag the economy to a serious crisis in the very 
end of Cardoso’s first term, after the president had already been reelected. Only in the 
last quarter of 1998 – when the contagion of the Russian crisis unfurled and minds 
became concentrated – the president began to abandon its ambivalence and the 
government started to show effective commitment to the adoption of a more 
consistent economic policy.  
 
The beginning of Cardoso’s government in early 1995 was marked by the fallout of 
the Mexican crisis. While during most of the second half of 1994 the government had 
been finding ways to increase competition of imports as a way to keep inflationary 
pressures in selected sectors of the economy under control, after December 1994 the 
situation was radically changed as Brazil was hit by balance of payments difficulties, 
in the wake of the Mexican crisis. That would be only the first of a sequence of major   5
external shocks that the first Cardoso government would have to deal with amidst its 
efforts to consolidate the achievements of the Real Plan. 
 
In the first half of 1995 the government announced an ambitious program of reforms 
that envisaged an overhaul of the public sector, including massive privatisation and 
reforms of the civil service and of the social security system. But fiscal discipline 
would have to wait for Cardoso’s second term. The government followed a very lax 
fiscal policy in 1995 and was slow to react to the asymmetrical consequences of the 
sharp fall of inflation on public accounts. The well known positive effect of lower 
inflation on tax revenues was not as strong as could be normally expected because, 
after such a long high inflation experience, the tax system had been strongly sheltered 
from the worst effects of inflation. But high inflation had been helping to keep 
expenditures under control, eroding the real value of budgeted appropriations. Overall 
public sector primary surplus (the difference between total revenues and total non-
interest expenditures) which had reached 5.6 percent of GDP in 1994 was brought 
down to around zero in 1995  and 1996, before being turned into a deficit of one 
percent of GDP in 1997. 
 
The stabilization plan had initially envisaged a real-US dollar parity within a R$/US$ 
0.93-1.00 band. But the real was allowed to appreciate to R$0.85/US$ and held 
around this level from mid-October 1994 to early March 1995, when the exchange 
rate policy had became a serious bone of contention within the economic team, deeply 
divided on how to react to the Mexican crisis. A mediated Solomonic solution led to a 
bungled attempt to widen the band. It was met with a speculative attack that brought 
about a sizable deterioration of the risk premium of Brazilian bonds over US 
treasuries, from 10 to 15 percentage points. A new band, with R$/US$ 0.88-0.93 
bounds, was created and an inner band was used as a crawling peg with an 
unannounced devaluation of 0.6 percent monthly.  
 
This exchange rate regime was to last until early 1999. Combined with an 
unflaggingly loose fiscal policy, it led to a persistent deterioration of the trade balance 
that would condemn the first Cardoso government to four years of very tight 
monetary policy, marked by extremely high real interest rates. Such an unsound 
macroeconomic policy would take a heavy toll. The current account deficit rose from   6
1.8 billion in 1994 to around US$ 20 billion in 1995 and 1996 and to more than US$ 
30 billion in 1997 and 1998. The other side of the coin was, of course, the dramatic 
rise in the capital account surplus as a result of high interest rates and strong 
privatisation-related capital inflows. 
 
In a major step to consolidate the low inflation regime, key legislation reducing price 
and wage indexation was approved by Congress in 1996, allowing the annual 
consumer inflation rate to fall to 9.6 percent, from 22.4 percent in 1995. Several banks 
faced problems with the fast transition to a low inflation environment. The Central 
Bank was forced to intervene and to create a special programme to institutionalize 
such efforts under the name of Proer – Programa de Estímulo à Reestruturação e ao 
Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro Nacional [Programme to foster restructuring 
and strengthening of the national financial system]. Provisions to cover Proer-related 
losses had reached almost R$ 9 billion [around US$ 3 billion] in 2002.  
 
The situation of banks owned by the states became especially difficult. Important 
efforts were made to assure that the states would start to put their accounts in order. 
There was a comprehensive strengthening of federal control over the finances of 
subnational governments. Significant incentives were offered to induce states to 
renegotiate their debt. The most important state banks were privatized. But the idea of 
privatising the biggest state bank, Banespa – Banco do Estado de São Paulo [Bank of 
the State of São Paulo], that had been under intervention since the end of 1994, met 
such a strong resistance from the desenvolvimentista group that it was almost 
abandoned in late 1995. Over the following year, the ample access of state governors 
to federal funds provided by BNDES, in anticipation of privatisation proceeds of 
electricity-supply companies owned by the states, would open a loophole that 
significantly undermined initial efforts to impose a hard budget constraint to 
subnational governments. 
 
In view of the dramatic deterioration of public accounts observed in 1995, it was 
expected that the government would be engaged in a serious fiscal adjustment effort 
during its second year in office. By that time, however, the idea of giving top priority 
to preparing the ground for a constitutional amendment that would allow the president 
to be re-elected had already gathered strength in Brasilia. With an eye in the October   7
municipal elections, the desenvolvimentistas were particularly forceful in the defense 
of that idea, stressing the need to avoid untimely fiscal adjustment measures that 
could alienate the president’s support, not only in Congress but also among mayors 
and state governors. Quite on the contrary, the desenvolvimentistas pressed for a still 
more flexible fiscal stance.   
  
Some would say that postponement of the fiscal adjustment was essential to pave the 
way for re-election of the president, viewed as the only form of making sure that 
politically complex reforms would continue to be implemented and stabilization 
preserved. Others suggest that there were elements of political overkill in the re-
election campaign and that the president squandered significant political capital which 
could have been used to prop more comprehensive reforms, especially in the fiscal 
field. 
 
2.  HEADING FOR A CRISIS: 1997-1998 
  
The year of 1997 started well for the government. The constitutional amendment 
allowing re-election of the president was approved, the risk premium on Brazilian 
external bonds fell to near 4 percentage points and foreign direct investment flows 
were breaking records. Annual consumer inflation expectations had been lowered to 
around 5 percent. The government seemed convinced that it had plenty of time for 
correcting the macroeconomic imbalances that were leading to the rapid deterioration 
of the external accounts and unsustainable public indebtedness. But the tug of war 
within the economic team was still going on. The desenvolvimentistas were pressing 
for a new exchange rate regime, lower interest rates, more public investment and 
faster economic growth. Their oppositors, in the Ministry of Finance and the Central 
Bank, feared that the inflationary shock and the destabilization process that might be 
entailed by a devaluation could put the achievements of the Real Plan in jeopardy. 
They argued that, with a tighter fiscal policy, the exchange rate regime could be 
sustained with much lower interest rates and faster economic growth. However, 
between the two offsetting forces, economic policy was still following the same old 
line of least resistance, marked by ambivalence, irresolution and procrastination. 
Neither there was any sign that the exchange rate regime was to be abandoned nor any   8
reasons to believe that a more austere fiscal policy was to be finally adopted. In fact, 
fiscal policy was still being loosened up. The desenvolvimentistas had just won the 
last episode of the power struggle, as the government decided that privatisation 
proceeds, that were supposed to be entirely channeled to redeem public debt, would 
be partly used to finance a public investment program. 
 
In the third quarter of 1997, however, Brazil was hit by the shock waves of the Asian 
crisis. To no avail, the president tried to point out that  Brazil was a whale, not a tiger. 
The crisis exposed the vulnerabilities of the economy. Between the end of September 
and the end of November foreign exchange reserves fell from US$ 62 billion to US$ 
52 billion and the risk premium on Brazilian bonds rose from 4 to 7 percentage points. 
The benchmark interest rate, which had fallen to 19 percent in June, rose to more than 
45 percent in November, when the government had to announce a hastily prepared 
fiscal package.  But the gap between promises and deeds turned out to be wide. The 
government once again revealed a pronounced lack of commitment with the idea of a 
serious fiscal adjustment. As it became clear that the simple choreography of apparent 
mobilization with the adjustment had been enough to allow the country to overcome 
the worst part of the crisis, the proposed measures were either watered down or just 
not implemented. In April 1998, the situation seemed to have improved as strong 
capital inflows, stimulated by the sizable differential between domestic and 
international interest rates, allowed foreign exchange reserves to reach US$ 75 billion. 
By that time, the nearing electoral campaign made the government conspicuously 
postpone any plans for dealing with the increasingly inconsistent macroeconomic 
policy to the following presidential term. This would prove to be an unwise move. 
 
There was still another big external shock to be faced. In August, two months before 
the presidential election, the Brazilian economy would start to suffer the devastating 
contagion of the Russian crisis, just when the government had made clear how 
uncommitted to the required macroeconomic adjustment it really was. The failure to 
deliver minimally on the fiscal adjustment side was in open conflict with the 
sustainability of the strategy of sticking to the crawling-peg regime. A speculative 
attack against the overvalued currency in the mid of the electoral campaign led to a 
fast loss of reserves.  By the end of the year the loss had reached US$ 30 billion, in 
spite of a benchmark interest rate lifted to around 40 percent. The risk premium on   9
Brazilian external bonds went beyond the 14 percentage points mark. Net public debt, 
which had risen from 30 percent to 33.3 percent of GDP over the 1994-1997 period, 
had reached 41.7 percent by the end of the year.   
 
The economy’s growth performance had been declining since the 5.9 percent increase 
in GDP in 1994. Over the 1995-1997 period GDP increased on average 3.3 percent 
yearly, but in 1998 the economy stagnated. Fixed capital formation had improved 
slightly in 1994 to 20.8 percent of GDP but fell to an average 19.8 percent in 1995-
1998. 
 
As the crisis deepened, the government was caught in a very vulnerable position. 
Cardoso was forced to deliver a rather tough speech as presidential candidate stressing 
that a major fiscal adjustment would be implemented in the beginning of his new term 
of office. Contacts with the International Monetary Fund, that had started in 
September, were intensified after his re-election in the first electoral round in early 
October. A scandal triggered by wiretapping of privatisation deals, involving 
members of the economic team, left the government even more off balance, at an 
already trying moment. In December, a program involving a fiscal adjustment effort 
of about 4 percent of GDP was approved by the IMF. The preservation of the 
crawling-peg exchange rate regime was a central point of the program. The financing 
package totaled US$ 43 billion: about US$ 18 billion of IMF resources, US$ 15 
billion from the Bank for International Settlements and Japan, and US$ 5 billion each 
from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.  
 
In late December 1998 Congress approved a rather watered down social security 
reform, casting additional doubts on the sustainability of fiscal accounts. Few weeks 
later, in the beginning of 1999, as Cardoso’s second term started, the announcement 
by the state of Minas Gerais of a moratorium on its foreign debt proved to be the last 
straw for the crawling-peg regime. Its abandonment, in mid-January, after the 
substitution of Gustavo Franco, the Central Bank governor, involved first an attempt 
to avoid uncontrolled devaluation by widening the exchange-rate fluctuation band to 
between R$1.20/US$ and R$1.32/US$. As the attempt proved unsuccessful, the run 
against the real gathered overwhelming strength with a loss of US$ 14 billion of 
reserves in two days. The government was forced to accept a much bigger   10
devaluation. In late January the exchange rate had already jumped to almost than 
R$2/US$. A peak of R$2.16/US$ would  be reached in early March.  
 
Whatever the collective hindsight nowadays may be, both sides of the economic 
divide within the government and most analysts at the time believed that a significant 
devaluation of the real would mean a return to much higher inflation with foreseeable 
important political implications. Allegations by the opposition that the Cardoso 
administration postponed an overhaul of its economic policies because of the 
presidential elections in October 1998 are not groundless. But it is also true that the 
opposition’s economic program was totally inconsequential and that a victory by the 
opposition would have meant, almost certainly, an even more serious economic crisis.  
  
3.  1999 AND THE SHORT-LIVED VIRTUOUS CIRCLE 
  
In the somewhat chaotic aftermath of the devaluation, in the beginning of 1999, the 
difficulties that had to be faced were much amplified by the alienation of the support 
from the G7 and the IMF and by the fact that, for a while, the Central Bank remained 
totally crippled. Both the G7 and the IMF were blaming the government for lack of 
commitment to the whole idea of preserving the crawling peg that had been a key 
justification for the December bail out package. The Finance minister and the rest of 
the economic team had survived the crisis. But amidst the financial turmoil, the 
government decided to make another change in the governorship of the Central Bank. 
Over a two-month period the Central Bank had to operate under three different 
governors.  
 
The turning point, in early March, was a brand new board taking office in the Central 
Bank, led by still another governor, Arminio Fraga, a highly regarded economist with 
Wall Street experience. That opened the way for the announcement of a new 
stabilization plan to be implemented under the agreement that had been signed with 
the IMF three months earlier, just before devaluation. The program had three main 
objectives. First, to restablish fiscal sustainability, in view of the sizable increase in 
public indebtedness caused by the impact of devaluation on the dollar-linked part of 
the debt. Second, to assure that the external accounts would be compatible with the   11
much narrower foreign-financing possibilities the country was having to cope with. 
And, third, to keep inflation under control, despite the strong inflationary shock that 
had been triggered by the devaluation.  
 
The following months would witness a fast confidence-building process, in the wake 
of a powerful virtuous circle. It is hard to establish which factor had precedence in 
this process. But key roles were certainly played by the surprisingly low impact of the 
devaluation on inflation and the recognition that the government was being successful 
in its effort to make the politically demanding fiscal-adjustment effort feasible. The 
inflationary shock stemming from the devaluation proved to be much weaker than 
anticipated. And skepticism about the possibility of extracting from Congress the 
challenging fiscal-adjustment program that had been announced was greatly reduced.  
 
Rising optimism on both inflation and fiscal adjustment led to a fast appreciation of 
the nominal exchange rate, as foreign capital inflows were restored. That, in turn, 
opened the way for a very fast fall in interest rates, as the Central Bank determinedly 
brought down the benchmark rate from 45 percent per year in early March to less that 
20 percent in late July. Plummeting interest rates and a much less depreciated 
exchange rate brought about a drastic reassessment of the sustainability of fiscal 
accounts, allowing the worst misgivings about the public debt to be quickly 
dismissed. Expectations about the level of activity also changed radically. In March, 
the government had announced that the GDP could fall as much as 3.5 to 4 percent in 
1999. But in the end of second quarter, the size of the expected fall was being quickly 
reduced to zero, in anticipation of a much less costly slow down that in the end would 
still allow the economy to show a positive growth rate of 0.8 percent in 1999. By that 
time, the Central Bank was sufficiently comfortable to announce that the newly-
launched inflation-targeting policy would aim at a rate of 8 percent per year in 1999 
and of 6 percent in 2000. 
 
However, the fast overall improvement of economic indicators showed the dent of a 
serious disappointment. By late 1999, it was becoming clear that the response of the 
trade balance to the devaluation would take much more time than was being 
anticipated. The simple elimination of the US$ 6 billion trade-balance deficit 
observed in 1998 was widely seen as an insufficient adjustment, by no means   12
comparable to the spectacular improvement that was expected when the devaluation 
was at its peak in early 1999. It is true that under the newly-adopted flexible 
exchange-rate regime, the initial overshooting was followed by a fast revaluation of 
the real. But even so, in early 2000 the US$/R$ exchange rate was still more than 30 
percent below its nominal level before the devaluation. Taking into any account any 
reasonable domestic price deflator, that meant a very sizable real depreciation that in 
due time should bring about a much stronger adjustment in the trade balance than had 
been observed until then. However, lingering pessimism over the trade balance, 
fuelled by disappointment with the initial response of the trade accounts, would lead 
to a much overblown debate on whether the situation called for more interventionist 
trade and industrial policies. Though the economic team resisted such policies, they 
continued to be fiercely defended by the desenvolvimentistas till the very end of 
Cardoso’s second term, and remained an important divide within the government.  
 
Despite worries about the trade balance, in early 2000 external accounts were in much 
better shape than in late 1998. The Brazilian economy had left the turbulence behind. 
Fiscal targets accorded with the IMF had been achieved and inflation was under 
control. The economy seemed ready again for growth resumption. In fact, 2000 was to 
be by far the best year of Cardoso’s second term. Annual consumer price inflation 
was kept at 6 percent, exactly as targeted by the Central Bank. The fiscal situation 
became much less worrisome. The strong fiscal adjustment observed since the 
Russian crisis allowed the public sector primary surplus to reach 3.3 percent of GDP 
in 2000, in sharp contrast to a deficit of almost one percent of GDP in 1997. It is true 
that it had been a low quality adjustment, that was strongly based on a sizable increase 
in highly distorting cumulative taxes, given the political difficulties involved in 
expenditure slicing. The gross tax burden increased from 29 percent of GDP in 1997 
to 31.7 percent of in 1999. But misgivings about fiscal sustainability faded away as 
the adjustment seemed large enough to keep public-sector debt stabilized at around 50 
percent of GDP, particularly when a newly approved Fiscal Responsibility Law 
ensured that expenditures would remain strictly limited to the available means at all 
government levels (federal, state, and local). But the highlight of success of the 
macroeconomic policy adopted since the devaluation, with full support from the 
International Monetary Fund, was that economic recovery was finally in sight. The 
GDP growth rate reached 4.4 percent in 2000.   13
 
By the end of 2000, the impact of the sizable exchange-rate devaluation on external 
accounts was still unimpressive and much more limited than anticipated. Exports 
responded sluggishly, hampered by falling export prices, imports were not reduced as 
expected, and the economy’s current account deficit remained well above 4 percent of 
GDP. However, a record inflow of US$ 31 billion of foreign direct investment in 
2000, in the wake of important public-asset sales, was more than enough to cover the 
current account deficit of US$ 25 billion. There was a widespread view that sound 
macroeconomic policy and the perspective of sustained economic growth might be 
able to ensure the inflow of foreign capital that would be required to keep the 
expanding economy’s external-financing problems at bay. Despite lingering 
pessimism over the trade balance, the country seemed to have leeway to wait for the 
slow effects of the devaluation on the external accounts to be fully felt. 
 
Seen from early 2001, therefore, Brazil’s economic prospects looked quite promising. 
What was envisaged by the business community was a virtuous-circle scenario 
involving economic and political aspects. With the economy on a new low-inflation 
steady-growth path (expanding at 4 percent per year), the government coalition would 
be bound to win the late 2002 presidential election after three years of uninterrupted 
prosperity. Economic policy continuity would open the way for a longer period of 
sustained economic growth.  
 
Such widespread optimism would need to be rapidly and extensively revised over the 
following months. As 2001 proceeded, the external environment quickly became 
much less favorable. Hopes that bad news about the slowdown of the United States 
economy after a decade-long expansion were not to be taken very seriously, as a fast 
recovery was the most probable outcome, would soon prove to be unfounded. In 
February, the economic situation in neighbouring Argentina (which was supposed to 
have just found some respite with the approval of another large IMF support program 
in the very end of 2000) started to deteriorate quickly, exposing Brazil to still another 
wave of contagion. As markets once again tried to discern what could be the effects 
on the Brazilian economy of a worst-case scenario in Argentina, when the world 
economic outlook was becoming gloomier, the exchange rate started what would   14
prove to be a new and long depreciation movement. In March, the Central Bank was 
forced to interrupt the steady slackening of monetary policy that had been started two 
years before. Interest rates had to be hiked again. 
 
The growing uncertainty stemming from the rapidly worsening external environment 
was considerably aggravated by unconnected domestic troubles. Serious political 
strife within the complex government coalition in Congress started to raise doubts 
about the outcome of the 2002 presidential election, and to stir up fears that a newly-
elected leftist government could impose some sort of debt default. In the municipal 
elections held only six months before, in late 2000, the national campaign of the 
Workers’ Party (PT) had been centred on an informal plebiscite in which voters had 
been asked whether the public debt and the country’s external debt should be paid 
back or not. The worries were amplified in April 2001 when it became suddenly clear 
that the country was amidst an alarming energy crisis, caused by mismanagement of 
an excess-demand situation in the largely hydropower-based electricity-supply 
industry. The need to impose urgent but highly unpopular electricity-rationing 
measures and to abort economic growth made the government seem even less capable 
of assuring a favourable result in the nearing presidential election, in a moment in 
which the main opposition candidate, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, from the Workers’ 
Party (PT), was already leading the polls by a wide margin. The energy shortage 
looked as a final blow to hopes of keeping the economy expanding reasonably fast 
over the second half of the presidential term. 
 
These domestic troubles, however, would prove to be less damaging than initially 
anticipated. First, political infighting in the government coalition in Congress lost 
momentum and receded to less internecine quarrels. Second, the response to the 
electricity rationing program proved to be surprisingly positive, particularly among 
residential consumers. Soon it became clear that with a slight degree of luck regarding 
the intensity of rainfall over the following season, the rationing measures could be 
substantially relaxed by early 2002. However, just when the country’s short-run 
outlook was beginning to improve, Brazil was suddenly exposed to a whole new wave 
of difficulties triggered by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.  
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Even before the attacks the economy seemed much weaker than eight months before. 
With the growing uncertainty, the exchange rate had gone through another 25 percent 
depreciation, bringing considerable additional strain on inflation control. Though the 
benchmark interest rate had been lifted to 19 percent (from 15.25 percent in mid-
February), the Central Bank was starting to admit that it would be hard to keep the 
annual inflation rate below 6 percent. After industrial output plunged in the second 
quarter, as consumer sentiment and business confidence were badly hit by the string 
of bad news coming from both the external and the domestic fronts, forecasts for GDP 
growth rate in 2001 had been slashed from 4.5 percent to 2 percent or even less, 
anticipating the 1.3 percent growth rate that would be effectively observed. Much 
higher interest rates and the even more devalued currency had saddled the 
public-sector with a significantly heavier debt burden, stoking misgivings in financial 
markets about the sustainability of fiscal accounts. In August, concern over the 
destabilizing effects that a financial debacle in Argentina might have on the much 
weakened Brazilian economy led to a fast and successful negotiation of a new US$ 15 
billion support program with the IMF. 
 
For Brazil, the economic uncertainty triggered by the terrorist attacks meant a sudden 
exacerbation of predicaments that the country were already facing. With the world 
economy in an unequivocal recession and international investors becoming extremely 
risk averse, the external financing problem became considerably more difficult. It is 
true that, for months, the country had been bracing itself to deal with increasing 
difficulties in that area. Of course, what was feared was nothing like what happened 
after September 11, but merely a critical deterioration of the economic situation in 
Argentina and the loss of confidence that could stem from widespread pessimism in 
financial markets about the outcome of the presidential election. The sudden external 
shock seemed to have brought about severe external financing difficulties even before 
those two feared problems have materialized. 
 
4.  UNDER THE SHADOW OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY 
 
After showing some improvement in late 2001 and early 2002, the economic situation 
deteriorated dramatically in the following months. The year started under a relatively   16
calm climate. The economic consequences of 11 September had proved to be less 
adverse than had been feared after all. The country was leaving the energy crisis 
behind, as a favourable rain season was replenishing hydro-electric dams, political 
infighting within the government coalition seemed to have receded and the currency 
was strengthening. Financial markets were even starting to nurture the idea that, after 
all, one of the government-supported candidates could win the presidential election. 
In mid-March, however, such hopes suffered a major blow, in the wake of 
unsurmountable dissention in the government camp, after a Federal Police raid 
triggered a campaign-funding scandal that crippled the candidate that was being 
fanned by the conservative Liberal Front Party (PFL) and happened to be faring 
particularly well in the polls. 
 
Over the second quarter of 2002, it became increasingly clear that the remaining 
government supported candidate, Senator José Serra, of Cardoso’s Brazilian Social 
Democratic Party (PSDB), would not be able to beat Lula da Silva -- the front-runner 
candidate of the Workers’ Party (PT). The Liberal Front Party (PFL), which 
comprised a sizable part of the broad political coalition that had been assembled 
around President Cardoso, had quit the government immediately after the scandal that 
brought down its candidate and was staunchly determined not to endorse Serra in any 
circumstance. Even in Serra’s own party, full support was hard to get. An attempt to 
attract the endorsement of the notoriously fractious centre-right Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party (PMDB) to Serra’s ticket had a very limited success. Large segments 
of the catch-all PMDB decided to steer their own independent courses. 
 
As doubts over the outcome of the presidential election quickly disappeared and the 
idea that Lula might win became more concrete, mounting fears about the newly-
elected government’s economic policy and a possible default gave rise to devastating 
destabilising forces driven by wild anticipatory movements in financial markets. The 
nominal exchange-rate, which was at less than R$2.4/US$ in early March reached the 
3.4 mark in the end of July, after the currency had lost 30 percent of its value. At that 
point, international financial markets were demanding a staggering risk premium of 
24 percentage points above the interest paid on US treasuries in order to hold 
Brazilian external-debt bonds.  
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Alarm over the rapid deterioration of the economic situation led the government’s 
economic team to approach the leadership of the Workers’ Party (PT) in order to 
negotiate initiatives that could help to control the turmoil in financial markets. Within 
the Workers’ Party, an effort to soften the more radical planks of the party’s economic 
platform was already under way. Moderate party leaders perceived that the mounting 
destabilisation process could bring severe strain to the newly-elected government and 
even put Lula’s seemingly assured victory in jeopardy. In a statement in late June, 
presented as an open letter to the Brazilian people, Lula tried to assure that he was 
committed to a sound macroeconomic policy and that investors had nothing to fear. 
But financial markets were unconvinced. 
 
Uncertainty over what could be the economic policy of the newly-elected government 
increased even more in July, as the government endorsed candidate dropped to the 
third place in the polls, overtaken by a large margin by Ciro Gomes, a centre-left 
contender, supported by the small Popular Socialist Party (PPS), previously seen as a 
mere also-ran. But financial markets saw little reason for calming down, as Gomes 
had been insisting on a vague plan that allegedly would convince investors to 
voluntarily swap short-term for long-term public-debt bonds. 
 
In August, as the word panic started to be used all too often to describe the degree of 
unrest observed in financial markets, a major new development took place. Since at 
least June, the government had been trying to negotiate a new loan agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund. But many difficulties had to be faced. At first, the 
thought of extending credit to bail out still another large emerging market economy – 
just after Argentina and Turkey – met with strong resistance from the main industrial 
economies. But Brazil was not the only South American country facing financial 
destabilisation. Less than eight months after having been bailed out, Argentina was 
facing serious problems again, amidst a devastating banking crisis that had crossed 
the River Plate and was imposing serious financial distress to neighbouring Uruguay. 
Concern over the consequences for the world economy of the whole region being 
sucked into a huge economic crisis rapidly allowed resistances to be broken, giving 
way to more pragmatic stances in the industrial economies.  
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The idea that at least some of the troubled South American economies had to be duly 
assisted gathered strength in Washington during July. Though Argentina was 
considered to be a hopeless case, the small-scale bailing out of Uruguay seemed not 
only defensible but easy. But the Brazilian case looked more challenging. The 
mobilization of the required resources would be much more demanding and the idea 
of signing a loan agreement with an outgoing government, without any guarantee that 
it would be honoured by the newly-elected one, seemed untenable. But five years 
before, in 1997, a similar difficulty had been successfully faced in South Korea, when 
the terms of an urgent bail out package signed with an outgoing government had to be 
approved in a pre-election deal, all candidates pledging to honour them. During July 
the economic team had been trying to convince the leadership of the Workers’ Party 
(PT) of the importance of creating the required conditions for making a similar deal 
possible before the election. But party leaders were clearly split on that issue. 
 
The idea of controlling the worrying destabilization process entailed by the mounting 
turmoil in financial markets seemed undoubtedly urgent. Underlining Lula’s 
commitment to a sound economic policy would also be helpful to bring swinging 
conservative middle-class voters to the candidate’s camp. On the other hand, after so 
many years of unrelenting IMF bashing, a formal pledge to honour the main terms of 
an agreement with the International Monetary Fund was seen by the party’s left-
wingers as an unacceptable surrender. It was also feared that the deal could make Lula 
lose faithful radical-left voters. At the end, moderate views prevailed, as radicals were 
convinced that a mild support to a possible agreement would be very important to 
allow Lula to win the election. 
 
In early August the IMF announced a new agreement with Brazil involving a US$ 30 
billion loan – the largest ever made by the institution – over a 15 month period. Only 
US$ 6 billion were to be disbursed before the end of Cardoso’s presidential term. But 
as the Fund raised constraints that the previous agreement imposed on the use of the 
country’s foreign reserves, the Central Bank would also have another US$ 10 billion 
available to face the financial nervousness about the outcome of the election and to try 
to keep external financing difficulties at bay. The remaining disbursements, 
amounting to a carrot of US$ 24 billion offered to the newly-elected government, 
would be made during the first year of the following presidential term.    19
 
Though there was no previous explicit endorsement by the leading presidential 
candidates, two weeks later, after some natural hesitation, they pledged to honour the 
main measures that constituted the backbone of the agreement, in separate meetings 
with President Cardoso. The formality marked an extremely important rite of passage, 
particularly for Lula, as it gave him a freer hand in what had become a clear effort to 
drop the radical talk and quickly move towards the centre. 
 
Financial markets showed some relief, but remained ready to cast doubts on the 
sincerity of Lula’s change. The risk premium of Brazilian external-debt bonds, 
relative to interest paid on US Treasury securities, fell from 24 percentage points in 
late July to around 16 percentage points in early September. After a four-month long 
depreciation, the currency strengthened by 12 percent during August. But the respite 
did not last much. Though Serra had become again Lula’s main contender, as Ciro 
Gomes slipped fast in the polls, it became strikingly clear over September that Lula 
would win the first round of the presidential election in early October, and be in a 
very favourable position to beat Serra in the run-off election, endorsed by the 
remaining opposition candidates. With the growing unrest in financial markets, the 
currency lost more than 20 percent of its value in September. By the end of the month, 
just before election day, the exchange rate had reached R$3.9/US$ and the risk 
premium on Brazilian external bonds was back to 24 percentage points. 
 
Lula was elected president, as expected. But even before the run-off against Serra, the 
leadership of the Workers’ Party (PT) had launched a major effort to convince public 
opinion, and financial markets in particular, that the newly-elected government had 
abandoned the previous radical talk and would adopt a quite orthodox macroeconomic 
policy, following the paths of the outgoing government. As the new economic team 
took shape and seemed to give credibility to what was being promised, skepticism 
slowly receded, giving way to what would be a long confidence building process 
bound to be stretched for many months, well into Lula’s presidential term.  
 
But calming down financial markets would require stronger measures. Immediately 
after the first round of the election, the Central Bank finally set off what would prove 
to be a very sizable three-movement rise in interest rates. Over a period of less than   20
60 days, the basic rate was lifted from 18 to 25 percent. By year end, the exchange 
rate, at R$3.5/US$, was in a clear appreciating trend, and the risk premium of 
Brazilian external bonds, at 14 percentage points, was falling steadily.  
 
The high uncertainty wave that had started to be formed well back in 2001 and had 
gathered much strength after March 2002 was surely taking its toll. The economy 
expanded only 1.9 percent in 2002, bringing the average GDP growth rate of 
Cardoso’s second term to a mere 2.1 percent per year. The flexible exchange-rate 
regime had helped to make the economy bend without breaking. But the major price 
shock entailed by the vast depreciation of the real, had made the expected annual 
consumer-price inflation close the year well above the two-digit threshold, at more 
than 13 percent, putting the newly-adopted inflation-targeting policy under strain. But 
the depreciation had also speeded up the long-waited adjustment that seemed to be in 
store for the external accounts, since the early 1999 devaluation. All in all, the trade 
balance had shown an improvement of nearly US$ 20 billion over Cardoso’s second 
term, and the current account deficit had narrowed from US$ 33.4 billion in 1998 to 
US$ 7.6 billion in 2002.  
 
The fiscal regime had also gone through a drastic change. A Fiscal Responsibility 
Law, approved by Congress in 2000, had finally imposed budgetary discipline on 
subnational governments. In contrast to the previous presidential term, for the fourth 
consecutive year, the public sector had been generating a primary surplus between 3 
and 4 percent of GDP, in order to meet interest payments and keep public debt on a 
sustainable path. However, as a large part of the public debt was dollar-linked, the 
sharp depreciation of the exchange rate observed during the last half of Cardoso’s 
second term had cast new doubts on the sustainability of the debt, particularly after 
interest rates had to be briskly raised in late 2002. But most analysts agreed that, as 
long as the exchange-rate overshooting could be reverted and interest rates quickly 
reduced to less extreme levels, the reasons for fearing that the public debt could slip 
out of control would rapidly fade away. 
 
As Cardoso’s second term reached its end, it became quite clear that a political 
change of great economic importance had taken place while the country faced the 
rough passage of 2002. After three unsuccessful attempts, the Workers’ Party (PT)   21
had finally won the presidential election. But, as it advanced towards its victory, the 
party had to dust off old beliefs, drop the radical talk and hastily adopt a brand new 
economic program, that in fact endorsed the essence of the outgoing government’s 
macroeconomic policy. That was no small change. It meant that the alarming chasm, 
that had separated government and opposition in economic matters for so long, was 
giving way to an amazingly broad common ground of shared ideas.  
 
The events of 2002 are still too recent to allow a complete understanding of the 
complex process behind the hurried metamorphosis the Workers’ Party (PT) had to go 
through in 2002. But some basic facts seem to be uncontroversial. It was mentioned 
above that over the second quarter of the year, in the wake of the turmoil in financial 
markets, the broad idea of dropping the radical economic talk and move towards the 
centre gathered strength in the party leadership and finally gave rise to the June 
statement, in the form of an open letter from Lula to the Brazilian people. But that 
document required a very tough negotiation within the party and was only approved 
under the general understanding that it would represent the farthest the party would go 
in its movement towards the centre.  
 
The fact that party’s aggiornamento would advance well beyond that point in the 
following months has to be explained by the dynamics of the electoral campaign and 
the complex relationship that was established between the Workers’ Party and the 
government, in a tacit joint effort to curb the worst effects of the mounting 
destabilization that was under way. At first, that relationship had to involve subtle 
games, as the one that finally made Lula feel constrained to publicly pledge to honour 
the general terms of the agreement that was being signed with the IMF in mid-August. 
But soon it had evolved to a much more explicit interchange of ideas, based on levels 
of understanding and collaboration that would seem completely unthinkable a few 
months before. The outgoing government should receive a substantial share of the 




The first months of 2003 would witness how far the newly-elected government would 
go in its effort to abide by the pledge of moderation in economic policy. The choice of   22
the economic team was the first concrete indication that the government was really 
inclined to follow policies that the Workers’ Party (PT) would be ready to brand as 
unacceptably conservative only months before. The destabilization process that had 
been triggered by the electoral uncertainty in 2002 had brought about a sour 
inheritance for the newly-elected government. The fast depreciation of the currency 
had entailed both a serious inflationary shock and a sharp and worrisome increase in 
the dollar-linked part of public debt. Financial markets were unsurprisingly uneasy 
and disbelieving, far from convinced of Lula’s change of course. The situation called 
for very orthodox economic measures. For the amazement of many, the new 
government responded accordingly. 
 
The benchmark interest rate, that had been raised from 18 to 25 percent during the last 
two months of the Cardoso government, was lifted still further to 26.5 percent in the 
first two months of the Lula government. A tighter fiscal policy target was also 
announced. Those measures proved to be highly effective to break the reluctance of 
financial markets to accept the idea that the government was really committed to the 
adoption of a consistent macroeconomic policy. A fast confidence rebuilding process 
was triggered, much helped by a rapid improvement in the trade balance, that was 
being brought about by the joint effect of the four-year long sizable depreciation of 
the  real and the strong demand for Brazilian exports in world markets. Lower 
uncertainty and much healthier external accounts led to a fast appreciation of the 
currency. The exchange rate, that had closed 2002 at more than R$3.5/US$, was 
already below R$3/US$ by late May. Over the same period, the risk premium of 
Brazilian bonds over US treasuries plummeted from 14 to 8 percentage points. 
 
Despite the initial success of the economic policy, in mid-2003 there were still 
widespread doubts on how long the government would continue to show the required 
persistence in sustaining measures that were known to be strongly opposed by hard-
core members of the Workers’ Party (PT). By that time, however, the government 
displayed the courage of its new convictions, by managing to approve an important 
and politically challenging social security reform in Congress. The waning of 
economic uncertainty and the favorable evolution of inflation allowed the Central 
Bank to start a long and steady loosening of monetary policy, that would help to 
soften the resistance to the government’s macroeconomic policy. As the benchmark   23
interest rate was brought down from 26.5 percent in June 2003 to 16 percent in May 
2004, there was a fast increase in the level of activity. After showing a growth rate of 
only 0.5 percent in 2003, the economy would grow almost 5 percent in 2004.  
 
In contrast to what had happened so often in the past, economic recovery was 
accompanied by a very strong improvement in the external accounts. As the trade 
surplus jumped from US$ 13.1 billion in 2002 to US$ 33.7 billion in 2004, the current 
account deficit of 1.7 percent of GDP was turned into a surplus of almost 2 percent of 
GDP. The long-waited structural adjustment of the Brazilian economy, that had been 
gathering strength during Cardoso’s second presidential term, had finally emerged 
with full force, opening up much more promising possibilities for the steering of the 
economic policy.  
 
For a newly-converted government that had to face much internal resistance to the 
idea of adopting unpopular orthodox policies, being able to rapidly reap the fruits of 
such policies was certainly a great help. Growth resumption with strong external 
accounts already in the second year of Lula´s presidential term reinforced the position 
of those that had defended that the Workers’ Party (PT) should take a more moderate 
tack, and strengthened the political support of the economic team.  
 
For the country, the success of Lula’s newly-adopted economic policy meant a very 
promising change. The broadening of the common ground of economic ideas shared 
by the main political parties, that looked as no more than a mere possibility in late 
2002, suddenly seemed more concrete and less reversible. A great problem Brazil had 
been facing for many years was the ever present spectre of a change of government 
that could suddenly turn economic policy upside down. Fear of such reversion was for 
a long time a very important source of uncertainty and instability, with dire 
consequences, as the events of 2002 had so dramatically shown. The possibility that 
reasons for such fears were finally disappearing meant that wider horizons for long-
run economic decision making were being open, as a major risk factor was being left 
behind. 
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5.  REFORMS, PRIVATISATION AND TRADE POLICY 
                                         
Under Cardoso, efforts to deepen the programme of economic reforms started in the 
early 1990’s were uneven. Privatisation proceeded and included public utilities, 
raising complex regulatory problems not always well solved. After some reversal at 
the beginning of the first presidential term, trade liberalization was deepened although 
at a much slower pace than in the earlier period. Major efforts were directed to put 
public accounts in order. This involved recognition of accumulated hidden liabilities, 
the building up of a legal framework to assure a hard budget constraint at all 
government levels, and intervention in state banks followed by privatisation. There 
was also a major effort to reduce the vulnerability of private banks through a series of 
interventions and government-supervised sales. Results of reform of social security 
were rather meagre under Cardoso.  
 
Some reforms were quite successful. Major constitutional amendments included 
legislation that opened the way to privatisation of public enterprises in 
telecommunications, mining and  electricity supply. Sales involved jewel-of-the 
crown assets such as Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, a world leader in iron ore exports, 
and also public enterprises whose privatisation required a major overhaul of the 
regulatory framework, especially in the telecommunications and electricity supply 
sectors. New agencies were created to regulate activities in the oil, electricity and 
telecommunications industries, with much more autonomy than had been the case in 
the past. Regulation in the oil sector was complicated by the dominant role of 
publicly-controlled Petrobras. The government maintained a golden share when Vale 
do Rio Doce was privatized. By far the least satisfactory policies involved the 
electricity supply sector, with the government failing to define a clear regulatory 
framework able to stimulate new investments. Privatisation revenues in the whole 
Cardoso period amounted to more than US$ 87 billion.  
 
No major tax reform was implemented during Cardoso’s period. The tax burden 
remained around 29.4 percent of GDP in 1995-1998, but jumped to an average of 33.5 
percent of GDP in 1999-2002 and reached 35.9 of GDP in 2004. In order to minimize 
transfers to subnational governments, the federal government showed a clear   25
preference for increasing the importance of taxes not affected by constitutional 
revenue-sharing provisions. A new tax on financial transactions created in 1996, the 
CPMF  – Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentações Financeiras [Provisional 
contribution on financial transactions], would prove to be far from provisional. 
Avoidance of revenue sharing also explain the increase in the increasing importance 
of other contributions as PIS –Programa de Integração Social [Social Integration 
Programme] and Cofins –Contribuição   para o Financiamento da Seguridade Social 
[Contribution to finance social security]. Being imposed on turnover and not on value 
added, those cumulative taxes were marked by well known highly distortionary 
effects, including taxation of exports in a hard to rebate way. Even in the case of the 
value added tax collected by the states (ICMS), only in 1996 legislation was 
introduced to extend rebates to exports of non-industrial products. But both the PIS 
and the Cofins were later transformed into non-cumulative taxes. The first in 2002, 
the latter in early 2004.  
 
Foreign direct investment flows increased dramatically as privatisation efforts moved 
from the simpler cases of state-owned manufacturing firms to state-owned public 
utilities, both at the federal and state level. Foreign direct investment (FDI) rose from 
US$ 1.9 billion in 1994 to US$ 15.3 billion in 1997 and to a peak of US$ 31 billion in 
2000. Then it started to fall, reaching US$ 12.9 billion in 2003 and recovering to US$ 
20.3 billion in 2004.  In 1995 about two thirds of FDI stock in Brazil was in the 
industrial sector and one third in services. In 2000, the shares had been reversed 
 
Deterioration of the balance of payments position in early 1995 provided a platform 
for active promotion of a reversal of trade liberalization by the desenvolvimentistas. 
The average tariff rose from 11.2 percent in 1994 to a peak of 14.7 percent in 1997 
and then started to fall again. In 2002 it was still above its 1994 level. This affected 
more significantly the automotive sector – effective protection on motor cars rose to 
no less than 270 percent in 1996  – and also capital goods and industrial inputs whose 
tariffs were at or near the 35 percent level bound in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Price effects were significant, however, as the overvaluation of the real made 
imports cheaper. The share of imports in apparent consumption, which had risen from 
4.5 percent in 1989 to 10.6 percent in 1994, continued to increase to reach a peak of   26
22.5 percent in 1998. It was then reversed in the wake of the 1999 foreign exchange 
devaluation, falling to 13.9 percent in 2003.  
 
Total exports increased only slightly above 4 percent yearly in the whole Cardoso 
period and Brazil lost market share in world exports. That loss was reversed only in 
2003. Trade with Mercosur, and especially with Argentina, increased substantially 
after 1994 and its share in exports peaked in 1998 on 17.8 percent compared to 13.6 
percent in 1994. After the Brazilian devaluation of 1999 and even more after the 
Argentinean abandonment of its currency-board foreign exchange regime, Mercosur’s 
share in Brazilian exports fell to 5.5 percent in 2002 and increased again to 9.1 
percent in 2004. The significant expansion of Brazilian exports after 2002 was 
accompanied by the rising importance of non-traditional exports markets as China, 
whose market share trebled since 2000 to reach more than 6 percent. The European 
Union and the United States answered for similar shares of the Brazilian export 
market, hovering around a quarter of the total. But while almost 80 percent of 
Brazilian exports to the United States were manufactures this share fell to only a third 
for the European Union and to 25 percent for Asia. Almost 90 percent of Brazilian 
regional exports – both to Mercosur and to the rest of Latin America – are 
manufactures.   
 
Several regional trade negotiations were started in the mid-1990’s. In December 1994 
a hemispheric summit agreed to launch negotiations seeking to establish a Free Trade 
Area in the Americas until 2005. Negotiations were marked by important differences 
between Brazil and the United States and were still deadlocked in the end of 2004. 
Negotiations between Mercosur and the European Union were also deadlocked. In the 
multilateral field, Brazil imposed in 1996 a quota system on imports of automobiles 
and tried to obtain a waiver under GATT 1994, which was not accepted by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). But by far the most important dispute settlement episodes 
in which the country was involved recently was the exchange of complaints with 
Canada on subsidies to exports of aircraft when the decisions in favour and against  
Brazil were roughly equivalent. More recently, Brazil obtained important victories in 
panels concerning subsidies to cotton growers by the United States and sugar exports 
by the European Union. The launching of a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations faced a major setback in Seattle in 1999, but in 2001 a new round was   27
launched at Doha. Brazil has played a prominent role in the negotiations as part of a 
G-20 group of developing economies, together with China, India and South Africa, 
that contributed to counter efforts by developed countries to delay agricultural 
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Table 7.1 
Brazil, main economic variables, selected years, 1980-2003  
 
  1994 1998 1999 2002 2003 2004 
Resident population, mid-year, million  156.8 165.7 168.7  176.4 179.0 181.6
GDP (1980=100)  130.7 144.6 145.7  157.0 157.8 165.5
GDP per capita (1980=100)  100.8 105.5 104.9  108.7 107.7 111.3
Gross fixed capital formation as percent of GDP  20.7 19.7 18.9  18.3 17.8 19.6







GDP deflator yearly rate, percent  2240.2 4.8 4.7  10.2 15.0 8.2
Real exchange rate*,  1980=100  69.3 72.7 97.9  96.0 86.9 80.4
Exports, US$ billion  43.5 51.2 48.0  60.4 73.1 96.5
Imports, US$ billion   33.1 57.7 49.3  47.2 48.3 62.8
Current account, US$ billion   -1.7 -33.6 -25.1  -7.7 4.1 11.6
Foreign direct investment inflow, US$ billion**
  1.9 23.3 27.6 18.8 12.9 20.3
Total foreign debt, US$ billion  148.4 241.6 241.5  227.7 235.4 220.2
Reserves
*** , US$ billion   38.8 44.6 36.3  37.8 49.3 52.9
Terms of  trade (1980=100)
# 113.1 130.7 113.4  115.1 113.4 114.0
Primary surplus, percent of GDP  5.6 0 3.2  3.9 4.3 4.6
Total public debt-GDP ratio, percent  30.4 41.7 49.4  55.5 57.2 51.7
Prime interest rate
## USA, percent  4.21 5.35 4.97  1.67 1.13 1.35
Benchmark interest rate
###,
 percent   1383 29.5 26.3  19.1 23.4 16.2
Sources: IBGE, Brazilian Central Bank and International Monetary Fund.  
* Real effective exchange rate using wholesale prices in Brazil (IPA-IT) and in its 16 more important trade partners,  
weighted by exports of manufactures, Ipeadata. The higher the index the more depreciated the Brazilian currency.  
** Net foreign investment, including reinvestment. 
*** Central Bank, international liquidity concept. 
# Ipeadata. 
## Annual average, Federal funds, Federal Reserve. 
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